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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case arises out of a family law dispute that began 
in 2011 and remains pending in Hudson County, New Jersey. 
                                              
* Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg, District Judge, 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Over the past eight years, the family court has required 
Appellant Surender Malhan to pay some $300,000 in child and 
spousal support to his putative ex-wife, Alina Myronova. The 
crux of Malhan’s complaint is that New Jersey officials 
violated his federal rights when they failed to reduce his 
support obligations after he was awarded custody of their two 
children and Myronova obtained a job that pays more than his 
own. The District Court dismissed Malhan’s second amended 
complaint, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. And to the extent it had jurisdiction, the 
District Court declined to exercise it under Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37 (1971). In our view, Malhan is entitled to federal 
court review of some of his claims. So we will affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.  
I 
 In February 2011, Myronova sued Malhan for divorce 
in Hudson County, New Jersey.1 The family court awarded 
Myronova full custody of the couple’s two minor children and 
ordered Malhan to pay $6,000 per month for child and spousal 
support. Malhan also had to give Myronova rental income from 
their jointly owned properties, which the court earmarked for 
mortgage payments.  
                                              
1 The family court case is Myronova v. Malhan, No. FM-
07-001952-14. We view the facts in the light most favorable to 
Malhan because the District Court accepted his pleaded facts 
as true and treated the State’s motion to dismiss as a facial 
attack on jurisdiction. See Schuchardt v. President of the United 
States, 839 F.3d 336, 343 (3d Cir. 2016); Malhan v. Tillerson, 
2018 WL 2427121, at *1–2 (D.N.J. May 30, 2018). 
4 
 
After suffering these setbacks, Malhan received some 
favorable rulings from the family court. In 2012, he was 
awarded joint custody of the children, which increased their 
proportion of overnight stays with Malhan from zero to more 
than half. The year after, the court found Myronova owed 
Malhan about $44,000, half of which was rental income 
Myronova had embezzled for personal use rather than pay the 
mortgage. The other half was spousal support the court ordered 
her to return because she had been living with her boyfriend.  
Soon after he obtained these favorable rulings, Malhan 
sought a reduction in his child support obligations. But the 
court decided to postpone any reduction until a final judgment 
of divorce, which still has not issued. And in the years since, 
the gap between what Malhan must pay and what he should 
pay has only widened. See N.J. Rule of Court 5:6A, Appendix 
IX-A, Considerations in the Use of Child Support Guidelines 2 
(2018); App. 28–30. By 2016, Myronova’s annual income had 
increased from zero to more than $100,000—well over 
Malhan’s income of about $60,000.  
Despite this reversal in their economic fortunes, Malhan 
still must pay Myronova $3,000 per month in child support—
an amount the court refuses to recalculate even after 
acknowledging it is unusual “for a parent who is not the parent 
of primary residence” to receive child support. App. 56 ¶ 179. 
Relying on that comment, Malhan briefly stopped paying child 
support. Because the comment was not an order lifting his 
obligations, however, Malhan fell into arrears, and the court 
ordered his wages garnished.  
Unable to find relief in family court, Malhan filed a six-
count complaint in federal court. The three counts most 
5 
 
relevant to this appeal seek declaratory or injunctive relief 
against New Jersey officials for violating federal law: 
• Count 2 challenges the disclosure of Malhan’s bank 
records and the administrative levy of his bank account. 
It alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 669a, a provision of 
the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 
(CSEA) to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. See 
Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305; App. 42–49. 
• Count 5 claims Defendants are violating Malhan’s right 
to due process of law by refusing to permit 
counterclaims and offsets to his child and spousal 
support debt. See App. 54–55. 
• Count 6 alleges that the garnishment of Malhan’s wages 
violates the CSEA and § 303 of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673. See App. 55–64. The 
family court’s garnishment order was in place until 
March 2018. The court then vacated its order in 
response to the U.S. Department of Labor, which said 
the garnishment violated § 1673(c). See App. 75–76.2 
                                              
2 New Jersey claims “[t]he only challenged conduct on 
the part of the State Defendants is the OCSS [Office of Child 
Support Services] levy, which is moot.” N.J. Br. 10 (citing App. 
18–19). That is incorrect. Count 2 challenges the alleged 
disclosure of bank records (and the agency levy). See App. 42–
49. Count 5 contests the debt from the child support and 
spousal support orders. See App. 54–55. Count 6 challenges 





 The District Court dismissed Counts 2, 5, and 6 on two 
independent grounds. First, the Court held it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which 
bars district court review of state court judgments. See Malhan 
v. Tillerson, 2018 WL 2427121, at *6–8 (D.N.J. May 30, 2018). 
It reasoned “(1) the Family Court has made a determination as 
to Plaintiff’s parenting situation, as well as Plaintiff’s child 
support obligations; (2) Plaintiff is complaining of these 
findings; (3) the Family Court made its findings before 
Plaintiff filed this matter; and (4) Plaintiff is asking this Court 
to overturn the Family Court’s findings.” Id. at *6 (applying 
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010)). Second, the Court invoked 
Younger abstention to decline jurisdiction. See id. at *6–8. It 
did so because Malhan’s suit implicated “important state 
interests” and the New Jersey family court offered an 
“adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” Id. at *7. 
Malhan filed this timely appeal.3  
                                              
And the State points to nothing in the record that 
suggests the levy is moot. Its only citation is to the District 
Court opinion, which noted that the family court had vacated 
its garnishment order. Malhan, for his part, certifies that OCSS 
levied his bank account as recently as February 2018. App. 72 
¶ 17. He attaches a scan of OCSS’s own “Notice of Levy” as 
support. App. 73–74. 
3 Malhan did not appeal the dismissal of Counts 1 or 4. 
The District Court also dismissed Count 3, which alleged 





We first address the District Court’s holding that it 
lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. That doctrine 
                                              
only one of the provisions, the Court held that the CSEA does 
not provide a private right of action.  
That methodology was error. “Only by manageably 
breaking down the complaint into specific allegations can the 
District Court proceed to determine whether any specific claim 
asserts an individual federal right.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 
U.S. 329, 346 (1997) (examining child support under Title 
IV-D). The requisite degree of specificity is “whether the 
‘provision in question’ was designed to benefit the plaintiff.” 
Id. at 342 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los 
Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989)); see also, e.g., Cuvillier v. 
Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 404–05 (5th Cir. 2007) (analyzing 42 
U.S.C. §§ 651, 652, and 654(4)(B), (13)). And normally, “this 
defect is best addressed by sending the case back for the 
District Court to construe the complaint in the first instance.” 
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346.  
But instead of challenging the Court’s holding, Malhan 
argues that the Declaratory Judgment Act entitles him to relief. 
See Malhan Br. 30–34 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2201). “[T]he 
Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only,” Aetna Life Ins. 
Co. of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), and 
“presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right,” 
Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960). It creates a 
remedy, not rights. See State Auto Ins. Companies v. Summy, 
234 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir. 2000). We will affirm the dismissal 
of Count 3 for that reason. 
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conflicts with the familiar maxim that federal courts have a 
“virtually unflagging” duty to exercise jurisdiction conferred 
by Congress. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). At the same time, 
federal district courts are not amenable to appeals from 
disappointed state court litigants. A litigant seeking to appeal a 
state court judgment must seek review in the United States 
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Id. As the Court has 
explained:  
Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited 
circumstances in which [the] Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28 
U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United States district 
court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction 
in an action it would otherwise be empowered to 
adjudicate under a congressional grant of 
authority, e.g., § 1330 (suits against foreign 
states), § 1331 (federal question), and § 1332 
(diversity).  
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 
291 (2005) (emphasis added).   
Although those “limited circumstances” arose only 
twice in the Supreme Court—in Rooker and Feldman 
themselves—lower courts applied the doctrine liberally for 
some time. See, e.g., id. at 283; Thomas D. Rowe Jr. & Edward 
L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at Last? 
Rooker-Feldman Analysis after the Supreme Court’s Exxon 
Mobil Decision, 1 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 367, 370–71 (2006). That 
changed in 2005 when the Court decided Exxon. There, the 
Court reversed our expansive interpretation of Rooker-
Feldman and “confined” the doctrine “to cases of the kind from 
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which [it] acquired its name: [1] cases brought by state-court 
losers [2] complaining of injuries caused by state-court 
judgments [3] rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and [4] inviting district court review and rejection 
of those judgments.” 544 U.S. at 284; accord, e.g., Geness v. 
Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 360 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 Given these elements, the problem with the District 
Court’s application of Rooker-Feldman is readily apparent: 
Malhan does not “complain[ ] of injuries caused by [a] state-
court judgment.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added). In 
fact, as the District Court implied in its order denying 
reconsideration, there is no judgment at all because Malhan is 
complaining of “findings” and “determinations” of the family 
court. App. 4. But does Rooker-Feldman apply to the family 
court’s interlocutory orders?  
The answer is less than clear. Before Exxon, we thought 
Rooker-Feldman barred review of interlocutory state court 
orders that “resolved, at least for the moment, the dispute 
between the parties which forms the basis of the federal 
complaint.” Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. 
of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Since Exxon, we have not addressed whether Port Authority 
remains good law. See, e.g., Argen v. Kessler, 2018 WL 
4676046, at *6–7 & n.10 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2018). And the 
decisions of our panels and district courts have been 
inconsistent. Compare, e.g., Shawe v. Pincus, 265 F. Supp. 3d 
480, 489 (D. Del. 2017) (citing Port Authority and collecting 
four non-precedential opinions applying Rooker-Feldman to 
interlocutory orders after Exxon), and Mayeres v. BAC Home 
Loans, 2011 WL 2945833, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 21, 2011) 
(citing Port Authority and stating “the suggestion that Rooker-
Feldman does not apply to interlocutory orders is at odds with 
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Third Circuit precedent”), and Raphael Graybill, Comment, 
The Rook That Would Be King, 32 Yale J. on Reg. 591, 596–
600 (2015), with Argen, 2018 WL 4676046, at *7 (declining to 
apply the doctrine to interlocutory orders), and RegScan, Inc. 
v. Brewer, 2005 WL 874662, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2005) 
(same). 
Exxon itself offers conflicting guidance. On the one 
hand, “judgment” might include non-final orders like 
preliminary injunctions. That reading would follow the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) 
(“‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any 
order from which an appeal lies.”). On the other hand, Exxon 
described Rooker and Feldman as cases in which “the losing 
party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state 
proceedings ended.” 544 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added); accord 
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531 (2011). That language 
suggests that Rooker-Feldman applies only to final state court 
judgments. And the Court’s holding that Rooker-Feldman “is 
confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired 
its name,” 544 U.S. at 284, invites disagreement about the 
scope of Rooker and Feldman.  
Fortunately, six of our sister circuits have reconciled 
Exxon’s different readings by holding that interlocutory orders 
are “judgments” only when they are effectively final. The 
foundational case in this “practical finality” approach is the 
First Circuit’s Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta 
de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 
2005). Five courts of appeals have cited Federacion with 
approval. See Robins v. Ritchie, 631 F.3d 919, 927 (8th Cir. 
2011); Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1274–76, 1279 (11th 
Cir. 2009); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 & n.2 
(10th Cir. 2006); Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 
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F.3d 77, 89 (2d Cir. 2005); Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme 
Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended on 
denial of reh’g, 2005 WL 1692466 (9th Cir. July 21, 2005).  
Federacion outlines three situations in which there is a 
Rooker-Feldman “judgment.” The first is when “the highest 
state court in which review is available has affirmed the 
judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved.” 
Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24. Then the judgment is a “[f]inal 
judgment[ ] or decree [ ] rendered by the highest court of a 
State in which a decision could be had” under § 1257. Id. 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)). The Supreme Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction in those cases, and “the state proceedings 
[have] ended” under Exxon. 544 U.S. at 291; see Federacion, 
410 F.3d at 24. 
The second situation is when “the state action has 
reached a point where neither party seeks further action.” 
Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24. An example is when a lower state 
court “issues a judgment and the losing party allows the time 
for appeal to expire.” Id. Or “the lower state court does not 
issue a judgment but merely an interlocutory order (e.g., a 
discovery order determining whether certain documents were 
privileged), and the parties then voluntarily terminate the 
litigation.” Id. at n.10. In this situation, unlike the first, usually 
there is not “an appealable ‘final judgment or decree rendered 
by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had’ 
under § 1257.” Id. at 24 (alterations omitted) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 1257(a)). But under these circumstances there is a 
Rooker-Feldman “judgment” because the state proceeding has 
“ended.”  
Lastly, there is a judgment when a state proceeding has 
“finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation,” 
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even though “state law or purely factual questions (whether 
great or small) remain to be litigated.” Id. at 25. The First 
Circuit based this scenario on the Supreme Court’s second 
footnote in Exxon. That footnote states Rooker-Feldman would 
have applied to a hypothetical suit raised in ASARCO Inc. v. 
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). 
The hypothetical claimed the ASARCO petitioners 
should have attacked the state court decision in “a new action 
in federal district court” rather than an appeal in the Supreme 
Court. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 287 n.2. The Court disagreed. It 
reasoned that it had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the 
state court order under “exceptions to the finality requirement 
that were set out in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469 (1975).” ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 612, 622–23; 16B Charles 
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4010 (3d ed. Apr. 2019 update) 
(discussing the exceptions at length). Because the Court had 
§ 1257 jurisdiction, Rooker-Feldman would bar that district 
court suit.  
The First Circuit thus concluded that when a state court 
order is “final” under Cox, it is also final under Rooker-
Feldman. See Federacion, 410 F.3d at 26–27. So under the 
practical finality approach, there is a “judgment” if the 
challenged order is final under Cox or the state case has ended. 
We adopt this approach and hold that Rooker-Feldman does 
not apply when state proceedings have neither ended nor led to 
orders reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. 
B 
New Jersey cites several not precedential opinions in 
which we have applied Rooker-Feldman broadly even after 
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Exxon. See N.J. Br. 12 (citing Tauro v. Baer, 395 F. App’x 875, 
876–77 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam), and McKnight v. Baker, 
244 F. App’x 442, 444–45 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also, e.g., 
Mikhail v. Kahn, 572 F. App’x 68, 70 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam) (interlocutory family court orders).  
But those opinions contradict Exxon’s language and 
Rooker-Feldman’s rationale. Exxon demands that the doctrine 
occupy a “narrow ground” bounded by “ended” state 
proceedings like Rooker, Feldman, and ASARCO. 544 U.S. at 
284–87 & n.2, 291. The mere “pendency of an action in the 
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter 
in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Id. at 292 (quoting 
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). And that is 
because “the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ notion underlying Rooker 
and Feldman” is distinct from doctrines like preclusion, 
“comity, abstention, and exhaustion.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart 
& Weschler’s the Federal Courts and the Federal System 1410 
(7th ed. 2015); see Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) 
(per curiam) (distinguishing preclusion); Exxon, 544 U.S. at 
292 (distinguishing comity and abstention). That jurisdictional 
notion is, once again, that “Rooker and Feldman exhibit the 
limited circumstances in which [the] Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, 
precludes a United States district court from exercising 
subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be 
empowered to adjudicate.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291. 
There is more evidence that our not precedential 
opinions took Rooker-Feldman too far. In two cases following 
Exxon, the Supreme Court again limited the doctrine. See 
Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532 (holding that while “a state-court 
decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts, [ ] a statute 
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or rule governing the decision may be challenged in a federal 
action”); Lance, 546 U.S. at 466 (holding that the doctrine 
“does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court 
judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they 
could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment”). 
And the Court has “warned” lower courts to stop extending the 
doctrine “far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman 
cases.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 
283); see Skinner, 562 U.S. at 532. For beyond those contours, 
the doctrine “overrid[es] Congress’ conferral of federal-court 
jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state 
courts, and supersed[es] the ordinary application of preclusion 
law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 [the Full Faith and Credit 
Act].” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 
283).   
 At the same time, Exxon bars us from construing 
Rooker-Feldman too narrowly. Exxon stressed Rooker-
Feldman may apply when “the losing party in state court file[s] 
suit in federal court after the state proceedings [have] ended.” 
544 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added); accord Skinner, 562 U.S. at 
531. The Court could have—but has not—said that an “ended” 
proceeding is simply one in which the Court has § 1257 
jurisdiction. By declining that simpler explanation, the Court 
has presumably meant to ensure that lower courts do not 
review any proceedings that have ended even when the 
Supreme Court itself lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nicholson, 
558 F.3d at 1277 n.11. An example would be a case that misses 
its state’s independent and adequate appeal deadline. See 
Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24. 
 Our holding thus ensures we do not review state court 
proceedings that have “ended,” even when the Supreme Court 
lacks jurisdiction. That satisfies Exxon. And it limits the 
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interlocutory orders that count as “judgments” to those over 
which the Court has § 1257 jurisdiction. That respects Rooker-
Feldman’s jurisdictional basis.  
Applying these principles, we hold that none of the 
interlocutory orders in Malhan’s state case are “judgments.” 
For one, they are not “final judgments or decrees rendered by 
the [New Jersey Supreme Court].” 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). Nor 
have they “finally resolved all the federal questions in the 
litigation” or else satisfied practical finality under Cox. 
Federacion, 410 F.3d at 25; see Cox, 420 U.S. at 477–85. 
Malhan has had several motions pending since 2016, discovery 
is incomplete, no trial is scheduled, and the family court has 
made clear (so far) that Malhan’s support obligations will not 
change until a final divorce decree is entered. See App. 31; N.J. 
Br. 6–7. His state court proceedings are far from “ended.” 
Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291; see, e.g., Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24 
& n.10. So Rooker-Feldman did not deprive the District Court 
of jurisdiction.  
III 
A 
Having established that the District Court had 
jurisdiction over Malhan’s federal claims, we consider whether 
the Court erred by abstaining from exercising that jurisdiction. 
To promote comity between the national and state 
governments, Younger requires federal courts to abstain from 
deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state 
proceedings. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 
77–78 (2013); Younger, 401 U.S. 37.  
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In deciding to abstain, the District Court considered 
three factors announced by the Supreme Court in Middlesex 
County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 
U.S. 423 (1982): whether “(1) there are ongoing state 
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings 
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state 
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal 
claims.” Malhan, 2018 WL 2427121, at *6 (quoting Schall v. 
Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
But much has transpired since Middlesex was decided 
almost forty years ago. In Sprint, the Supreme Court 
underscored that Younger abstention conflicts with federal 
courts’ “virtually unflagging” obligation to exercise their 
jurisdiction. 571 U.S. at 77 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. 
at 817). And just as Exxon and its progeny limited Rooker-
Feldman’s scope, Sprint narrowed Younger’s domain. The 
Court explained—and we have stressed several times since—
that the “three Middlesex conditions” are no longer the test for 
Younger abstention. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81; e.g., Hamilton v. 
Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2017).  
Instead, Younger applies to only “three exceptional 
categories” of proceedings: (1) “ongoing state criminal 
prosecutions”; (2) “certain ‘civil enforcement proceedings’”; 
and (3) “pending ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders 
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform 
their judicial functions.’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78–79 (alteration 
omitted) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of 
City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)). Only 
after a court finds that a proceeding fits one of those 
descriptions should it consider Middlesex’s “additional 
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factors.”4 Id. at 81–82. Otherwise, “[d]ivorced from their 
quasi-criminal context, the three Middlesex conditions would 
extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal 
proceedings.” Id. at 81. So we must ask whether Counts 2, 5, 
and 6 challenge “exceptional” proceedings under Sprint.5 
                                              
4 We take this opportunity to note that Sprint abrogates 
Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003). That case 
involved a challenge to New Jersey family court contempt 
proceedings. See id. at 415–16. Plaintiffs, who had been jailed 
for civil contempt after failing to pay child support, sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief against future detention. See 
id. To decide whether declaratory and injunctive relief was 
appropriate, we applied only the Middlesex factors. See id. at 
418–23. And we reasoned that “[i]n New Jersey, child support 
orders and the mechanisms for monitoring, enforcing and 
modifying them comprise a unique system in continual 
operation.” Id. at 420. We viewed the system “as a whole, 
rather than as individual, discrete hearings.” Id. at 420–21.  
Sprint’s “exceptional categories” do not include 
“system[s] in continual operation.” True, “the federal court’s 
disposition of [ ] a case may well affect, or for practical 
purposes pre-empt, a future—or . . . even a pending—state-
court action.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 373. But “[a]bstention is not 
in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding 
involves the same subject matter.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72.  
5 Despite all this, New Jersey continues to press only the 
Middlesex conditions. See N.J. Br. 14–16. It does not even cite 
Sprint in its brief. This approach defies several controlling 
precedents identified in Malhan’s opening brief and a district 




Sprint’s first two categories do not apply here. None of 
Malhan’s counts involve criminal prosecution. Nor do any 
challenge a civil enforcement proceeding “‘akin to a criminal 
prosecution’ in ‘important respects.’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79 
(quoting Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)); 
see Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 
176, 182 (3d Cir. 2014); ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 
748 F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2014). Malhan’s wife, not the State, 
began the family court case. The case has not sought to 
sanction Malhan for wrongdoing, enforce a parallel criminal 
statute, or impose a quasi-criminal investigation. Rather, it has 
sought only to distribute assets equitably in the interests of 
Malhan’s children and putative ex-wife. 
So we ask whether Counts 2, 5, or 6 “involv[e] certain 
orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to 
perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 
(alteration omitted) (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368). Orders 
of that type are very much “unique[ ].” See id. at 79 (citing only 
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987) (bond 
pending appeal) and Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 & n.12 
(1977) (civil contempt order)).  
Count 2 involves the administrative collection of non-
final money judgments. See App. 42–49. It does not challenge 
how a court protects the status quo pending appeal as in 
Pennzoil, where the bond money was collateral in lieu of 
immediate execution. Nor does it challenge a process, such as 
                                              
Edelglass v. New Jersey, 2015 WL 225810, at *11 n.3 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 16, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433 
(3d Cir. 2017). 
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civil contempt, that is separate from the merits and that ends 
when the defendant complies. In fact, Count 2 does not 
challenge any judicial order at all. It challenges “executive 
action[s]” (bank levies) that have a layer of family court 
review—which means abstention is “plainly inappropriate 
under NOPSI.” ACRA Turf Club, 748 F.3d at 141 n.12; see 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368–70. In short, Count 2’s agency actions 
further family court enforcement—but not uniquely so. They 
are only a tool for collecting non-final money judgments in 
disputes between private parties. 
Count 5 perhaps attacks judicial orders, or at least the 
debt that has resulted from them. See App. 53–54. But those 
orders (or that debt) are not “uniquely in furtherance” of 
judicial functions. They are rather like the money judgments 
themselves in Pennzoil and Juidice. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 
6; Juidice, 430 U.S. at 329–30. They do not ensure that family 
courts can perform their functions—they are merely the output 
of those functions. Cf., e.g., Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos Pipeline, 
LLC, 872 F.3d 701, 703–04, 705 n.2 (5th Cir. 2017) (declining 
to abstain from review of eminent domain proceedings).  
As for Count 6, we need not decide whether family 
court garnishment orders are “unique[ ].” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 
78 (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368).6 That Malhan’s 
                                              
6 Although the State had ceased garnishing Malhan’s 
wages at the time of the District Court’s decision, Count 6 is 
not moot. The garnishment order lasted less than nine months 
(July 2017 to March 2018), see App. 56 ¶ 181–83, 72 ¶ 16—
which is well below the two-year threshold for mootness set by 
the Supreme Court. Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016); accord United Steel 
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garnishment proceeding is merely threatened—not “pending,” 
id.—makes abstention “clearly erroneous.” Miller v. Mitchell, 
598 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992)). State proceedings are 
pending only if they “are initiated ‘before any proceedings of 
substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.’” 
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984) 
(quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975)); accord 
17B Wright et al., supra, § 4253.  
This rule limits Younger even in criminal cases. In 
Wooley v. Maynard, for example, New Hampshire had thrice 
prosecuted and convicted Maynard for obscuring the state’s 
motto (“Live Free or Die”) on his license plates. See 430 U.S. 
705, 707–08 (1977). After his third conviction but before 
another prosecution, Maynard and his wife sought and received 
a federal injunction against future prosecutions for the same 
offense. See id. at 709. On Supreme Court review, the state 
argued Younger applied. See id. at 710–11. The Court 
disagreed. It reasoned that the Maynards faced “a genuine 
                                              
Paper & Forestry Rubber Mfg. Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers 
Int’l Union v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 842 F.3d 201, 208 (3d 
Cir. 2016). Also, Malhan alleges that the family court has 
repeatedly refused to recalculate his child support obligations. 
See App. 71 ¶ 13. That debt creates “a reasonable expectation” 
of future garnishment, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. 
Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) (quoting Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 
440 (2011)), even if Malhan has not “demonstrated [its] 
probability,” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 n.6 (1988). So 
the District Court had jurisdiction over Count 6 under 28 




threat of prosecution,” and that their suit was “in no way 
‘designed to annul the results of a state trial.’” Id. at 710–11 
(quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609). “[T]he relief sought [was] 
wholly prospective.” Id. at 711; see also Steffel v. Thompson, 
415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (allowing declaratory relief because 
“[w]hen no state proceeding is pending . . . considerations of 
equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality”).  
 In civil cases, the “pending” requirement naturally has 
at least equal force. Bearing this out are the Court’s only two 
examples of “pending ‘civil proceedings involving certain 
[unique] orders.’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (quoting NOPSI, 491 
U.S. at 368). In Juidice v. Vail, the Court required abstention. 
430 U.S. at 338. But it did so only because the state courts had 
issued contempt orders “at the time [the federal] lawsuit was 
commenced.” Id. at 331–32. So “unlike . . . the plaintiff in 
Steffel v. Thompson,” the Juidice plaintiffs faced “a pending, 
and not merely a threatened, proceeding.” Id. at 333.  
Similarly, in Pennzoil v. Texaco, a Texas jury returned a 
multi-billion-dollar verdict against Texaco. See 481 U.S. at 4. 
Just hours before the state court entered judgment, Texaco sued 
in federal district court, claiming for the first time that the state 
proceedings had violated federal law. See id. at 6 & n.5. Texaco 
asked the court to enjoin both the judgment itself and the state’s 
requirement that the firm post a cash bond before appeal. See 
id. at 6–7. But at that point, the district court faced a state jury 
verdict and the impending entry of a state court judgment. So 
whether the judgment or verdict “initiated” the state bond 
proceedings, the court had little or no time to precede them 
with its own “proceedings of substance on the merits.” Hawaii 
Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 238. Indeed, seven days passed before 
the court issued even a temporary restraining order. Compare 
Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 6 & n.5 (state judgment entered 
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December 10, 1985), with Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. 
Supp. 250, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (temporary restraining order 
issued December 17, 1985), and Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 
at 238 (declining to decide whether a temporary restraining 
order is “a substantial federal court action”). Unsurprisingly, 
then, the Supreme Court stressed that the state proceedings had 
been “pending.” Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 17; accord id. at 11, 14. 
And it mandated abstention.   
Malhan’s proceedings are nothing like those in Juidice 
or Pennzoil. The family court vacated its garnishment order last 
year and has not issued another. See App. 72. No factfinder has 
returned a verdict. No judgment waits to be entered. So Malhan 
faces only threatened garnishment. And like the plaintiffs in 
Wooley and Steffel, he can seek “wholly prospective” relief. 
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 711. That relief, as pled in Count 6, is that 
the District Court: 
a. Declare under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
that garnishment of a custodial parent[’]s 
wages is prohibited under CSEA [the Child 
Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984];  
 
b. [ ] Preliminarily and permanently enjoin 
State Defendants from garnishing Malhan’s 
salary so long as he is a custodial parent; 
[and] 
 
c. In the alternative, grant declaratory and 
injunctive relief to Malhan that State 
Defendants may not garnish payments which 
are not “earnings” nor garnish payments 
above what is permitted by the Consumer 
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Credit Protection Act and 45 CFR Section 
303.100(e). 
App. 63–64. On those terms, Malhan is not trying to “annul the 
results” of a past garnishment. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 711 
(quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609). So he may present Count 6 
in District Court.7 
* * * 
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction and 
should have fulfilled its “virtually unflagging” obligation to 
exercise that jurisdiction. We will reverse its application of 
Rooker-Feldman and Younger to Counts 2, 5, and 6 and 
                                              
7 New Jersey also argues in passing that we should 
abstain from review under Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800. See 
N.J. Br. 16–17. Colorado River abstention allows a court, in 
certain “exceptional circumstances,” to abstain from hearing a 
case to avoid piecemeal litigation. Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).  
Colorado River applies only when the parties and 
claims in the state suit are “‘identical,’ or at least ‘effectively 
the same’” as those in the federal suit. Kelly v. Maxum 
Specialty Ins. Grp., 868 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Trent v. Dial Med. of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 
1994), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized 
in Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Stephen, 647 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 
2011)). Here, we have different parties (New Jersey, not 
Malhan’s wife) and different claims (violations of federal law, 
not child support obligations).  
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remand for proceedings on the merits. We will affirm the 
Court’s dismissal of Counts 1, 3 and 4.  
